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Abstract 
Developing countries routinely lap up transnational ideas and set them into policy in their respective localit ies. 
The transfer and adoption of environmental rat ings and disclosure policy in the Philippines show that initial 
successes are sometimes difficult to sustain and can lead to dysfunctional programs.  This study argues that one 
way of explaining the dysfunction is by tracing it to the design and adoption of the policy. In this paper, the 
policy transfer process is analyzed focusing on agency and motivations and how these affect the features and 
outcomes of the process. The study finds that the transfer process was characterized by a focus on one model, 
attention on the solution rather than the problem, and external agents pushing rather than internal and distributed 
agents pulling in which  served to hinder adaptation and translation. This paper hopes to contribute to the thin 
literature on policy transfer in developing countries.    
Keywords: policy transfer, environmental information disclosure, Philippines environmental policy 
 
1. Introduction 
Developing countries have lapped up transnational ideas and set them into policy in their respective localities but 
while there have been a number of successful implementation, it is a reality that there remains a big disconnect 
between policy and practice. The adoption of policies patterned or copied elsewhere has been discussed in 
literature under various headings, the most common of which are policy transfer, diffusion and lesson-drawing.  
Diffusion studies tend to focus on the spread of policies over a spatial and temporal unit and mainly look at  
trends or patterns.  The terms lesson-drawing and policy transfer are used interchangeably to discuss how 
policies in one place are emulated or transferred to another jurisdiction but Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) make a 
distinction between the two by arguing that all policy transfers are brought about by rational agents voluntarily 
drawing lessons from other places and that other forms of transfers (undertaken coercively) are also possible.  
They later on developed a framework about the policy transfer process by conceptualizing a continuum where on 
one end, transfer is seen as an outcome of lesson drawing by rational actors in search of solutions to local 
problems elsewhere and where on the other extreme, transfer is seen as an imposition by external institutions 
such as funding agencies or international treat ies against the will of the adoptee.  The authors claimed that 
different types of transfer can be located in different parts of this continuum (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). Evans 
(2005; 2009) simplifies the categories by using both ends of the continuum and inserting a middle category—
that of negotiated transfers which essentially have both voluntary and coercive elements. Po licy transfer analysis 
is confined to subjects with a learning activ ity that is action-oriented, deliberate and results in policy act ion 
(Evans, 2009).   
The dimensions of transfer based on rationale have focused main ly on voluntary types of policy transfers 
between developed countries.  Some recent literature have highlighted cases of negotiated or indirect transfers 
that are said to be commonly found in developing countries and countries in transition (for example, Vinke-De 
Kruijf, Augustijn, & Bressers, 2012; Randma-Liiv & Kruusenberg, 2012). A collection of some cases involving 
developing countries that have been presented can be found in the compilation of Evans (2004) and in the special 
issue of the Knowledge, Technology and Policy Journal (de Jong, Waaub and Kroesen, 2007). Th is study 
provides additional insight using a case of policy transfer between two developing countries hoping to contribute 
to the literatures on transfer which thus far has been dominated by case studies of voluntary transfer concentrated 
in Northern America and in Europe. There is thus a need to build up on the literature by exploring more case 
studies of developing country policy transfers.   
This paper attempts to narrate the process of transfer and adoption of an innovative environmental policy in the 
Philippines called Ecowatch which was successfully piloted in 1996 and established as a national program in  
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1998.  Ecowatch is a version of an environmental perfo rmance rating and disclosure program (EPRD), a policy  
instrument that assesses the environmental performance of industries based on their pollution emission behaviour, 
rates them using a color-coded scheme and disseminates the results to the public.  It works on the premise that 
reputational sanctions brought by disclosure will generate external pressure for companies to comply with 
environmental standards and will supplement regulatory functions.  This strategy was developed by the 
Indonesian government agency, BAPEDAL in 1995, found to be successful and has since become popular 
among developing nations as a tool for pollution control.  Previous studies (Lambino, 2011) revealed that this 
policy’s success in the Philipp ines was limited to the pilot phase and was short-lived.  Nevertheless Ecowatch 
continues to be operational in the Philippines, albeit  in a dystunctional and sub-optimal manner.  It does not live 
up to its promise of an alternative means of environmental regulat ion as environmental rat ings are not publicly  
disseminated.  Outcomes have proved imaginary and the program’s effects are muted if not disappointing.  
Factors related to implementation (e.g. incompetence, lack of polit ical will) can account for the dysfunction, as 
well as lack of administrative capacity and institutional coherence—and these are being pursued as particular 
lines of inquiry in another study by the author.  However, problems regarding acceptability and capacity for full 
disclosure—the main mechanism supposedly utilized by the program to work—clearly indicates that there were 
issues in the formulation and adoption of the policy in the first place.  If implementers have difficulty with the 
disclosure concept, why was a program fundamentally  hinged on disclosure adopted in the first place? Is it  
possible that the implementation divergence observed currently, is linked to some issues during program 
development? The pilot was able to demonstrate that the program worked, so why was it not sustained?  This 
study argues that the dysfunction can also be traced all the way to the design and adoption of the policy.  Th is 
supposition is supported by authors like Winter (1986) who art iculate that many  implementation impediments 
can be found in the init ial stages of policy formulation, and Sugiyama (2011) who stress the need to extricate 
implications of policy decision making with its long-term effectiveness.  Ecowatch was considered as an 
outcome of policy transfer, so it is in this manner that the policy transfer process is revisited and the history of 
the program adoption and its consequent institutionalization is scrutinized in greater detail.   
One exp lanation explored by the author’s study focused on the notion of reform space and found that the high 
reform space brought about by high acceptance, ability and authority observed at the landing space led to 
successful implementation and outcomes of the pilot program whereas the lack of widespread bureaucratic and 
political acceptance as well as limited ability undermined the legal authority for Ecowatch at  the 
institutionalizat ion phase (Lambino, 2013b). In this article, attention is turned to the actual transfer process itself.  
It is posited that the manner of transfer had an effect on the program’s long-term viability and also that as a 
program that was foreign-assisted, it was mainly  supply-driven and as such faced more challenges in embedding 
the program in its context.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 lays out the development of the analytical framework and 
sources of data. Section 3 traces the transfer, adoption and outcomes of Ecowatch and delves into the actor 
configurations and motivations for the transfer process, while Sect ion 4 reflects on the findings and analysis.  
The paper ends with Section 5 presenting some concluding statements and some ways forward. 
 
2. Analytical elements and data sources 
Attempts at explaining policy failures by authors such as Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) have been criticized and 
found to be inadequate as they focus more on re-describing some aspects of failure as a type of transfer which  
can be either incomplete, inappropriate or uninformed (James & Lodge 2003).  Th is research takes up the 
challenge of James and Lodge by linking outcomes with the features of the transfer process.  In order to do th is, 
attention is paid to two particular aspects of the transfer process that are deemed important: the role of agency 
and motivations. 
 
2.1 Actor configurations and agency 
Policy transfer processes are defined to be intentional activities (Evans, 2009) and as such necessitates the 
presence of an agent or agents.   Agents involved in policy transfer have been enumerated to include government 
officials, civil servants, policy entrepreneurs and experts, transnational corporations, think tanks, supra-national 
governmental and nongovernmental institutions and consultants (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000) (Stone, 2004).  
International organizations not only play an important role in policy transfer as “policy entrepreneurs”, but may 
also play a coercive role by demanding policy reform as a condition of lending (Lana & Evans, 2004).  Or they 
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can impact on international norms and reinforce them through funding (Sugiyama, 2011).  At the global level, 
international organizations such as multilateral institutions and donor agencies have been instrumental in the 
promotion of best practices and successful policy/program innovations.  For instance, the World Bank in 1996 
restructured its organization and aimed to be a “Knowledge Bank” (King, 2002).  It is one of the most active 
international organizations with regard to documenting and sharing best practices especially to developing 
countries.   
De Jong, Lalen is, & Mamadouh (2002) in  their discourse on institutional transplantation have emphasized  the 
role that domestic actors play fo r a part icular policy transfer process to be successful.  In particu lar, they have 
expounded on the importance of the “pulling in” actions of domestic agents which involves ownership of the 
transferred policy, reframing or modifying as necessary and making it work within the scheme of things in their 
particular context.  In some cases de Jong and Bao (2007) argue that sometimes even if the two jurisdictions 
involved in the transfer seem to be inherently incompatible, the willingness and capacity of local actors to 
transform the transplant to make it suitable to the context makes a big d ifference between success and failure.  
For this study, the analysis will focus on identify ing the different types of actors involved in the transfer process 
and determin ing the extent of their push or pull, in terms of adoption and institutionalization of the policy into 
the context of the Philippines. In this paper, agency pertains to the actions of both institutions/organizations and 
individuals.  While the focus is on organizational agents in general, the role of individual agents especially  
policy entrepreneurs and so-called champions will also be discussed and expounded upon.  
 
2.2 Motivations and drivers for policy transfer 
Understanding motivations underpinning the use of foreign  information not only  helps explain where 
informat ion is sought and the extent to which the agents learn from this informat ion, but it  also helps exp lain  
how this informat ion is subsequently used.   Figure 1 simplifies the different types of transfer categorized by 
Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) in their policy transfer continuum and the corresponding motivations and drivers 
associated with each type as expounded upon in the extant literature.   The underlying theories behind the driving 
forces are important in understanding the mechanisms of how these various types of transfers take place and in 
explaining outcomes.  Weyland (2005), in his discussion of the diffusion of pension reform in Latin American 
countries provides a convenient nested-type of categorizat ion for the various explanatory frameworks espoused 
in the extant literature to drive d iffusion processes.  Since the concepts of diffusion and policy transfer are 
similar in the sense that they deal with the movement of policies from one geographical space to another, 
Weyland’s categorization is adopted and applied to the policy transfer process.  It is to be noted however that 
policy transfers are claimed to be more p ro-active and deliberate processes so modifications were made to h is 
categorization as depicted in Figure 1. This will be used as an analytical guide for the study in this paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Types of policy transfers (adapted from Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: Evans, 2004) and underlying causal 
mechanisms and theories driving policy transfer processes (adapted from Weyland, 2005). 
Coercive Transfers Voluntary Transfers 
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Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) argue that different motivations of key actors for the transfer process have an effect 
on the type of transfer that occurs.  Po licy  transfers are claimed to be driven by exogenous or endogenous 
pressures (Simmons, Dobbin, & Garrett, 2009).  Influences coming from agents exogenous to the adopting 
country abound especially  in  this age of g lobalizat ion.  When international organizat ions are involved, there is a  
tendency for coercion especially if conditionalities are present (e.g. loan/official aid  with conditionalities).  In  
some cases, governments are compelled to adopt policies from elsewhere by virtue of their membership to 
international institutions. This is explained by the external pressure framework (Weyland, 2005) and is claimed  
to describe many cases in developing countries.  It is acknowledged that different types of influence can be 
exerted by external agents but for this categorizat ion, the external pressure pertains to the actions of powerful 
external actors imposing or coercing the transfer processes.     
Over time the hegemonic ro le of international organizat ions have become more subtle as instead of coercing 
nation states to adopt their preferred policies and instruments, they are now persuaded especially by couching the 
policy innovations in “best practice” terms (de Jong et al., 2002).  In this sense while external influences remain, 
symbolic polit ics (Stone, 1999) and the quest for legit imacy (Bennett, 1997;   Sharman, 2010) lead ing to 
emulation and copying of policies can describe negotiated-type of processes wherein domestic agents voluntarily 
undertake transfers influenced by international agents.  The pursuit of legitimacy as explained by the normative 
imitation framework highlights the need to conform to the norms of international society (Powell & DiMaggio, 
1983).  Another type of motivation for policy transfer commonly observed in negotiated transfers but rarely 
discussed in detail in the extant literature is one where organizations are compelled to adopt an external idea or 
policy due to accompanying incentives such as funding and other benefits—a transfer identified in this research 
as mainly driven by supply (also in Randma-Liiv, 2005) rather than on demand.  This often comes from 
international organizations actively promoting solutions to developing countries tagged as best practice (M. 
Andrews, McConnell, & Wescott, 2010).  This commonly describes the case for foreign aid and is found relevant 
to this study. Where the desire for funding is greater than the commitment to policy reform, Matsumoto, King, & 
Mori (2007) claim that implementation is generally less than successful, however they have not undertaken any 
analysis why this phenomenon happens.   
Domestic factors are also posited to exp lain  policy  transfers.  Endogenous and voluntary init iatives arise from 
the rational search for solutions, which have been cited as the most common motivation for policy transfer (D. 
Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, Rose, 1991;  Bennett, 1997). If transfers are driven by utilitarian interests, the question 
of how policy makers assess the various policy alternatives and what drives them are relevant.  The rational 
learning framework suggest that actors have the capacity to undertake a wide-ranging search for solutions and 
that they can assess all relevant information in a thorough and systematic manner before making a decision to 
transplant a policy.  The cognitive heuristics framework on the other hand, reflects on the notion of bounded 
rationality.  This approach draws upon findings in  cognitive psychology that decision-making processes are 
inherently limited and agents do not weigh information in a fu lly  rational manner but rather usually make use of 
inferential shortcuts to maximize their efficiency (Tversky & Kahneman as cited in Weyland, 2005).  
These theoretical frameworks are hoped to inform the analysis of what drove the adoption of Ecowatch in  the 
Philippines as well as to explain the disappointing outcomes of the policy transfer process. 
 
2.3 Data Sources 
This case study was explored by reviewing program documents, monitoring databases, reports and assessments 
as well as extant literature pertinent to the program.  The institutional history and the main bulk of the data for 
the analysis came from semi-structured interviews. Project personnel mentioned in the literature and 
documentation of the development and formulat ion phase of Eccowatch were tracked down and contacted, 
initially through email correspondence. The initial contacts were asked to refer other possible respondents and a 
list was generated. A Skype conference call was granted by a US-based consultant in February 2012, and an 
email correspondence was undertaken with a former h igh-ranking official o f the Department of Environment and 
Natural Resources (DENR) in November 2012.  Face-to-face interviews were conducted during fieldwork in  the 
Philippines in July 2012 and January 2013 with a technical expert from the academe, a former Ecowatch 
champion and DENR staff members involved in the p ilot phase implementation.  For the institutionalizat ion and 
current status of the program, the Ecowatch program Secretariat head and relevant staff as well as four members 
of the Technical Evaluation Committee were interviewed.  A list of focal persons in the regional offices was 
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accessed and responses from the regional coordinators of the DENR Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) 
were generated from four face-to-face interviews, nine phone interv iews and one email correspondence.  Two of 
the regional coordinators failed to generate responses despite various follow up phone calls and fax/email 
correspondence. 
 
3. The transfer and adoption of Ecowatch 
This section looks into the various structural and agent factors that facilitated the transfer and adoption of 
Ecowatch in  the Philippines.  Following Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), this research asks the following questions: 
What is being transferred? From where are the lessons drawn? Who are the actors involved in the transfer 
process? What were the structures that enabled the process? 
The motivations, characteristics and actor constellations are also investigated looking into the nature of the 
transfer and how this affected the outcomes/operationalization of the transferred policy. 
 
3.1 What was transferred and from where? 
The use of informat ion disclosure as an instrument for environmental regulation became an innovation that 
followed the trend of various strategies such as market-based and command and control instruments.  The 
particular version of information-based regulation developed in Indonesia was lauded by the international 
community due to its perceived success and purported low cost of implementation (Wheeler & Afsah, 1996;  
Blackman, Afsah, & Ratunanda, 2004; Dasgupta, Wheeler, & Wang, 2007). 
In this particular case, it was not merely the concept of using information disclosure as a means of environmental 
regulation but the actual environmental performance ratings and disclosure policy  itself that was being 
transferred.  As explained by Bebet Gozun, former Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary 
in an interview (2013): 
“It was World Bank who facilitated…not an idea but there was already an initiative in another country, and 
they asked us in terms of the policy…environmental management especially on the government side was 
purely regulatory-- command and control, and we saw that that has not really been effective so we were 
looking at other mechanisms.  One of which is emerging in the world was the use of market based 
instruments… On the other hand aside from the market based instrument, we have public disclosure using 
the public—those that are the consumers to pressure the government and the private sector to do it right.”  
During  the in itial t ransfer process, lessons were drawn mainly  from Indonesia’s experience with the PROPER 
program.  It is to be noted that in time, other countries would develop their own version of EPRD and several 
workshops for sharing and exchanging lessons about EPRDs would be organized by the World Bank and the 
Asian Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Network (AECEN), but these came later on—in  2006 and 
2007 at workshops held in Beijing.  
A comparison between PROPER and Ecowatch indicate that indeed certain elements were modified.  Th is 
included the name of the program, the coding system, scope and coverage, as well as rating criteria (see Table 1).  
These differences are at the micro-level but the overall program design and structure are found to be similar.  In  
fact, the technical consultants’ report indicated that the two programs were similar at the conceptual level and 
that “the Ecowatch system was or more or less equivalent to the Indonesian system in terms o f the effort level 
required by industries to achieve a green rating” (Afsah, Casilla, & Tanchuling, 1997) 
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Table 1. Comparison between Indonesia’s PROPER and Philippines’ Ecowatch 
Source: compiled from Afsah, Casilla & Tanchuling, 1997 
*a revised version of Ecowatch inserted a 6th category, SILVER to denote performance between GREEN and GOLD 
 
3.2 Agents facilitating the transfer process 
Two main  actors were identified  to be involved in  the transfer process: the World Bank and the Philippine 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources.  It has been widely  documented that the World Bank has 
played a major role in the popularization of environmental performance rat ings and pollution control.  Their 
close contacts and work with the Indonesian government on various aspects of environmental management led  
them to  support the development of the EPRD strategy at the onset and the success of the policy experiment led  
them to believe that it was a strategy worthy to be shared to the developing world.  They acted as policy brokers 
when they approached the Philippine government to ask if they were interested in pursuing a strategy similar to 
Indonesia’s.  
On the one hand, World Bank was eager to test the feasibility of the new strategy as a means for pollut ion control 
and as such was looking to finance a similar program in  another country.  On the other hand, the Philippines was 
beset with issues on how to handle increasing industrial pollution and dissatisfaction with the status quo led them 
to be open to testing solutions from abroad. The Indonesian experience with EPRD was deemed a good example 
and a successful case and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources was thus quite receptive and 
very open to adopting the public disclosure approach. 
One of the individual actors crucial in linking the Ph ilippine government and the World Bank came in  the person 
of Bebet Gozun, the National Program Coordinator of the Metropolitan Environmental Improvement Program 
(MEIP), a  program established by the World Bank and the UNDP with the DENR to design and implement 
solutions to environmental problems in the Philippines.  As a consultant to the World Bank, she was exposed to 
the success of PROPER and in her capacity as coordinator for the DENR program MEIP, she also acted as an 
adviser to the Secretary  of the Department o f Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).  She was thus 
strategically positioned to act as a mediator between the World Bank and the Philippine government and was 
instrumental in convincing then DENR Secretary  Victor Ramos to apply the same concept of perfo rmance rat ing 
and public disclosure to the Philippine setting.  
At this point, the extent by which agents were “pulling” or “pushing” the transfer and adoption of Ecowatch 
during the pilot implementation of the program is analyzed.  The push of external actors may  be instrumental in  
facilitating or in itiating the transfer in the first place but it is the extent of the pull by domestic actors that was 
found to be crucial by de Jong and his colleagues (2003; 2007) with regard to adapting and making fit the 
content and form of the policy being transferred or transplanted.  After all, pursuing and sustaining of the 
transferred policy initiative lies in the hands of implementing actors. 
Elements of the 
Program  
Indonesia’s PROPER Philippines’ Ecowatch 
Program design  Environmental performance ratings and 
public disclosure 
Environmental performance ratings and 
public disclosure 
Criteria used Compliance with water quality standards Compliance with water quality quality 
standards (BOD) 
Basis for Effluent 
discharge  
Load-based standards (may also use 
concentration-based standards for some 
cases) 
Concentration-based standards 
Effluent standards  Vary across industrial sectors Uniform across industrial sectors (except 
for Biological Oxygen Demand) 
Coverage of rating 
system 
water and toxic pollution Water pollution 
Codes for the rating 
system 
5 color codes  
Black, Red, Blue, Green Gold 
5 color codes initially, changed to 6* color 
codes in 2003 
Black, Red, Blue, Green, Silver*, Gold 
Disclosure Strategy Press releases, media briefing Press releases, media event 
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This study looks at the different groups of actors responsible for the transfer process and the subsequent adoption 
of Ecowatch.  Table 2 presents the groups of actors responsible for the transfer and adoption of Ecowatch along 
with their ro les and the degree of push or pull they exerted during the transfer and piloting process.  The main  
domestic policy  actor identified here as “internal” was the DENR and specifically the DENR-National Cap ital 
Region (DENR^NCR) as the implementing agency for the pilot program. 
Table 2.  Different actors and their roles in the policy transfer process (pilot program implementation) of 
Ecowatch 
As had been described in  earlier sections of this chapter, external agents such as the World Bank and its team of 
consultants were crucial in in itiat ing the transfer process and thus gave the initial shove needed for the 
development of Ecowatch in the Ph ilippines.  The receptivity of the Philippine government through the DENR 
provided the initial (strong) reinforcement for Ecowatch.  
Policy brokers connected with the World Bank were keen on testing the idea of disclosure as a strategy for 
pollution control and to legitimize their role were therefore compelled to really make it work.  The design and 
formulat ion of the rat ing system were undertaken by the consultants hired specifically for the program.  As such, 
they were obviously driven by their contracts to deliver successful outcomes.  It is to be noted that not all of the 
consultants were foreigners.  In fact, conscious measures were taken to ensure that local expertise was employed 
(through the engagement of the technical team from the University of the Philippines College of Engineering), so 
as to ensure that the program was adapted to local conditions.  However it must be noted that even these local 
consultants were external to the implementing agency.  
The MEIP IEPC office and staff also played a strong pull for the adoption of Ecowatch.  In essence because 
funds were channeled through them, they had oversight of much of the program development. While the 
program was implemented in the geographical ju risdiction of the DENR NCR and the LLDA, the MEIP IEPC 
was hands on in the implementation of the pilot p rogram—they facilitated the discussions with the private sector 
to get them on board and to sign the Memorandum of Agreement and they provided oversight to the deliverables 
of the consultants.  As a funded project with clear deliverables and targeted outputs, program coordinators and 
staff of the MEIP were answerable to the donors and had to report progress and outcomes.   
While the DENR senior government officials approved and supported the adoption of Ecowatch, and hired and 
supervised the technical consultants to help develop and formulate the project, the involvement of agency staff 
specifically DENR NCR (and later on the Environmental Management Bureau or EMB) in the actual 
implementation of the pilot run was actually  found to be minimal.  On  the ground pollution inspectors/officers of 
the DENR NCR claimed in interviews that they mainly acted as sources of information and that they did not 
conduct the actual “run” of the program themselves. NCR staff declared their ro le was “mainly as supplier of 
information” and that “the consultants did everything” (DENR NCR, interviews). While they provided feedback 
on the criteria and guidelines to be used, they were not the ones making the final decision about the design of the 
program and its operationalization.  They also participated in the inspection, monitoring and validation activit ies, 
however the actual “run” of the pilot program that included analyzing the information and all the way to 
coordinating the public disclosures were all undertaken by personnel deemed external to the DENR EMB.  Even 
Agents Role Extent of push or 
pull 
Classified with respect to 
DENR-EMB 
World Bank Knowledge broker  strong push Foreign, external 
DENR Officials 
(Executive 
Committee) 
Approval of project, vetoing strong pull Local, internal 
Consultants (foreign 
from World Bank) 
Technical consultant  strong push Foreign, external 
Consultants (local) 
UP FERDFI 
Technical aspects of the program  strong push Local, external 
MEIP Office  Facilitator and coordinator of project;  strong pull Local, external 
DENR NCR and 
LLDA  
Involved in initial implementation as 
sources of information 
Minimal pull Local, internal 
DENR EMB Implementor of the program   Minimal pull Local, internal 
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the act of mailing advance notifications to the companies prior to disclosures were undertaken by staff of the 
MEIP and not the DENR NCR (Afsah et al., 1997). The project team tasked to test-run the idea was in effect  
composed of the MEIP staff and consultants. They had the financial resources, technical capacity and most 
importantly the drive and motivation to make the program functional. Again it is pointed out that these people 
who operationalized the program and made it work were still external to the implementing agency.  (It is to be 
noted that one of the main  policy  brokers, Bebet Gozun the program coordinator of MEIP later on became 
Secretary of the DENR.  It was only then when she became an integral part o f the organization (internal) that she 
was able to rally and champion Ecowatch to rev ive it from its inert state to be revised and legalized through a 
Departmental Administrative Order). 
This later on proved problemat ic as the inspectors had trouble applying the criteria and they did not have 
experience in running the program by themselves.  It has been shown that the transfer process was driven mainly  
by actors (not just foreign but also domestic) who were deemed external to the implementing agency.  Local and 
internal actors within the DENR d id not have the chance to “pull in” the program and to adapt it to their needs. 
Furthermore, this did not contribute to their ownership of the program.  Lambino (2013b) has shown that there 
was in fact a  widespread lack of acceptance and buy-in for the d isclosure program within  the bureaucracy which  
contributed to the dysfunctional operationalizat ion of Ecowatch.  Th is is in contrast with the experience of the 
PROPER program development in  Indonesia.  BAPEDAL also benefited from foreign technical and financial aid  
but even when these were withdrawn, domestic actors directly involved with implementation were ab le to 
fashion and work out the program details according to their needs.  
All informat ion about PROPER including the lessons learned and the contextual factors that made it successful 
were routed through the policy brokers who facilitated and shared the information to the Ph ilippine side.  During 
the actual transfer and development phase of the EPRD program in  the Philippines, there was limited  contact 
between the DENR agencies and BAPEDAL so the local agency had limited opportunity to analyze in detail 
how exactly BAPEDAL made the program work.   
A deeper look at the pilot run of Ecowatch during the period 1996 to 1997 indicates that the success of the 
piloted Ecowatch can be attributed to the fact that its implementation was driven mainly by actors who had more 
at stake in the success of the transfer process.   
 
3.3 Drivers for the transfer of environmental disclosure program in the Philippines 
What drove the adoption of public disclosure programs in the Philippines? Was there pressure from external 
sources or did the Philipp ine government exercise a search fo r solutions? The motivations for the adoption of 
ecowatch were also fleshed out in the course of the research. 
The strong influence of the World  Bank in the adoption of EPRD in  the Philippines cannot be discounted and 
therefore the external pressure framework was initially thought to be a prime motivation for the adoption of EPD 
in the Philippines.  The World Bank was eager to test the feasibility  of the new strategy as a means for pollution 
control and as such was looking for other cases to build up on their research.   They acted as transfer broker or 
policy entrepreneurs.  However this study has found no evidence of direct imposition or coercion.  The 
Philippine government was by no means forced to adopt the policy based on conditionalities from international 
aid.  The support provided to the Philippines was based on a grant to develop and pilot test an informat ion 
disclosure-based regulatory strategy.  When the World Bank brought up the idea of adopting a program similar to 
Indonesia’s PROPER, the Philippine government’s response was a strong “Yes, we were very interested” (Gozun, 
interview 2012).  At the time, policy makers in the Ph ilippines were on the look-out for solutions to the 
increasing levels of industrial pollut ion in  the country and were looking at other mechanisms as regulatory 
mechanis ms has been found not to be effective. Public disclosure systems were seen to be a promising solution 
matching the needs of the Philippine government.  This was confirmed by another high ranking DENR official at  
the time who stated that the motivations of adopting Ecowatch were based on “Two considerations-one was 
strategic-industrial pollution had risen to a higher priority. We were concerned about our inability to manage it 
effectively. Two-opportunistic. The World Bank gave an opening which we saw could help us address a strategic 
objective”(La Vina, personal communications 2012). 
These statements from the domestic policy actors involved in the transfer process, suggested that domestic 
policy makers had autonomy on the one hand.  On the other hand, the DENR also saw an opportunity in 
accessing technical and financial assistance from the World Bank.   Furthermore, the normative influences of the 
World Bank cannot be discounted entirely especially as they played a major role in the transfer process.  The 
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underlying theories behind these drivers will be discussed in turn. 
 
3.3.1 Lesson Drawing and Cognitive Shortcuts 
Domestic actors were qu ite willing to undertake the adoption of the policy which indicated that the Philippine 
environmental department was driven by their interest in resolving the rising pollution issues caused by 
industries and as such behaved as rational actors.  However, it was found out that Ecowatch was not a product of 
a wide ranging, systematic search and assessment for the best solution as described by the rational learn ing 
frameworks for policy diffusion. 
Information about the novel policy developed in Indonesia was made available to the Philippine policy makers 
by knowledge brokers of the World  Bank. Despite the relative newness of the perfo rmance rating and disclosure 
innovation at that time and a short track record, the Philippines was quite eager to try it out by virtue of the 
program’s success in Indonesia as perceived by the international community.  The limited informat ion about 
PROPER suggested that domestic decision makers used cognitive shortcuts in transferring the program to the 
Philippines. Further analysis was undertaken to look into the cognitive heuristics framework and to find out if 
the three primary inferential shortcuts of availability, representativeness and anchoring described in cognitive 
psychology regarding how agents decide under cases of uncertainty (see Tversky & Kahneman, 1974 for a 
deeper discussion) can provide an explanation of Ecowatch adoption.  The availability heuristic attributes the 
tendency to attach importance to information that is tangible, immediate and present. High impact, dramat ic or 
spectacular events capture attention and influence judgements and behavior. Neighborhood effects are claimed to 
be caused by this heuristic and this can be seen in the case of the environmental public d isclosure policy. The 
enthusiasm and attention generated by the pollution d isclosure policy in nearby Indonesia was something that 
prompted the Philippines to undertake the same.  Next , according to the representative heuristics, what guides 
decisions on whether to adopt a model or not, is the emphasis on short-term success and immediate outcomes.  
Such shortcuts allow decision makers to over-interpret and over-estimate informat ion—in this particular case, 
the Philippines had such high hopes of replicating the experience of Indonesia leading the country to be the first 
(early ) adopter of the policy instrument.  In the technical briefings to the press and public and launching of the 
program, the Philippine government continuously invoked the success of Indonesia’s PROPER as a means of 
justification of the policy. However, some literatures have since watered down some of the enthusiasm for these 
type of strategies by indicating various factors and pre-requisites that make these programs work (Blackman, 
2010;  Van  Rooij, 2010).  The third heuristic commonly used by agents to decide pertains to anchoring, where an  
undue weight is given to an initial value and thus affecting subsequent assessments.  This shortcut explains the 
tendency for restricted adaptation and in the words of Weyland (2005), it “limits the range and preserves the 
basic nature of the imported model”.  The Ph ilippines followed the template of PROPER and while adaptations 
were undertaken, it was limited to peripherals.  The foregoing discussions indicate that the manner of lesson 
drawing for this particular policy transfer is best described by the cognitive heuristics framework. 
 
3.3.2 Utilitarian Motives 
Another aspect that served as a factor in the transfer process was the window of opportunity cited by former 
DENR Undersecretary La Vina which provides evidence of the utilitarian mot ives –the added value of funding 
and technical assistance.  While the Ph ilippines in general is no longer considered an aid-dependent country 
(Hailu & Shiferaw, 2012), governmental departments in the past have relied heavily on foreign assisted projects 
and grants to fund its operations due to limitations in its own internal budgets.  The DENR in part icular is one of 
the departments receiving the smallest appropriation from the national budget.  Data show that DENR’s 
expenditures for 1998 was just about 0.8% of the national budget. Furthermore, most of the budget is spent on 
personnel services (some 85%) with very little  allotted for operations and capital expenses. During the 1990s, the 
DENR Environmental Management Bureau did  not have equipment fo r water sampling  and analysis and had no 
means to monitor the more than 10,000 industries under its regulation (Asian Development Bank, 2008).  As 
such, DENR has had to rely heavily on foreign assistance in order to bridge their funding gaps and to be able to 
meet their operational objectives (ib id).  It  is no wonder then that when international aid agencies offer g rants for 
program implementation, the Philippine government would be quite open and willing to take them on.  
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3.3.3 Quest for legitimacy 
Another more subtle way  of influence that international institutions have is through the promotion  of policies or 
innovations as models.  This has the effect of convincing and prompting countries to adopt these models by 
reshaping their preferences (Weyland, 2005).  This behavior to attain greater legitimacy through the adoption of 
practices vouched by external agents is also attributed to institutional isomorphism and is said to be commonly  
seen when entities are highly dependent on external constituencies for resources (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), 
as is the case for developing countries like the Ph ilippines. Andrews (2013) regards this behavior as a form of 
signaling to ensure that entities like governments in developing countries are able to attain as well as retain  
external support and legitimacy. Often, these efforts are rewarded with external perception of government 
effectiveness.   
For the case of Ecowatch, because of the presence of the World Bank, the norm-emulat ion mechanism can also 
be seen to be at work.  The World  Bank was able to influence the adoption process not through coercion but 
through persuasion—by making the adoption of the Indonesian PROPER model attractive to the domestic agents 
in the Ph ilippines.  It is to be noted that the Philippines is an active participant in the international environmental 
arena and is said to be one of the most responsive with regard to environmental management in Southeast Asia 
(Tan as cited in Florano & Prieto, 2008). It is also one of the countries with the most multilateral environmental 
agreements signed with a strong procedural compliance (mean ing, it dutifully abides with procedures such as 
report submission etc.) however substantial improvement in environmental conditions have yet to be reported 
(ib id). It  has continually looked  to the international sphere for ideas and been quick on the uptake for any policy  
trends or fashion and as such is likely to be strongly influenced by international norms.  For example, when 
market  based instruments, environmental certificat ion systems started to be in vogue internationally and the 
Philippines learned that other countries have adopted it, the government also learned to set up environmental 
user fees and other programs such as ecolabeling systems.  So when the information-based regulatory system 
model was developed, the Philippine government was quick to take it up for implementation. 
This study finds that the impetus for adoption of Ecowatch were actually three-fo ld:  as a means to gain 
legitimacy, as a sincere desire to generate a solution to a domestic prob lem and as taking advantage to access 
funding and technical expert ise.  Because of the manifest benefits that may  be achieved through the process, this 
study describes the phenomenon observed as an opportunistic-driven policy transfer.  Certain features arising 
from the theoretical underpinnings of the drivers of the process serve to explain the outcomes observed for the 
transfer process.  This is the subject for the next section. 
 
3.4 Outcomes of the transfer process 
The Ecowatch rat ings conducted in April 1997 indicated that only 4 out of 52 companies rated were compliant 
(granted BLUE code).  However after privately notify ing the companies about their ratings, prior to  full 
disclosure, some companies were reported to respond and improved their performance accordingly.  Full 
disclosure with broad media coverage was reported in November 1998 with a marked increase in the number of 
blue ratings: from 8% in April to 58% in November 1998. 
These results were very encouraging and generated immediate positive response from the companies.  Th is 
initial success convinced the DENR to adopt it as a new compliance monitoring system with the aim of 
promoting mandatory self-monitoring among industries. Thus, the Industrial Ecowatch was adopted in June 1998 
as Departmental Administrative Order (DAO) 98-51 within the Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources.  This administrative order specifies the adoption of the Industrial Ecowatch system by the DENR as a 
national program and provides implementation guidelines.  It was to be carried out by the staff of the then 
Environmental Management and Protected Areas Service (EMPAS) in the DENR Regional Offices.  Section 4 of 
DAO 98-51 specifies the criteria for rating and the color code assignments while Section 8 specifies that the 
disclosure of the results will be done once a year after prior information to the rated industries.    
Up to this stage, it  can be said that the transfer of environmental performance rat ing and public disclosure 
(EPRD) from Indonesia to the Philippines can be deemed successful.  However, a closer investigation and 
tracking of its implementation from the time it was institutionalized as a DAO in 1998 and its many on and off 
implementation and revivals up to the present revealed issues and challenges.   
After DAO 98-51 was enacted, the program did not take off and effectively became inert for many years.  It was 
revived in 2003, when Bebet Gozun one of the policy brokers for the EPRD transfer, was appointed as DENR 
Secretary where she amended and revised the Industrial Ecowatch system through DAO 2003-26.   Since the 
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revised administrative order in 2003 was released, the regional offices of the EMB have been conducting 
environmental performance ratings for the companies in their respective regions.  However what is interesting to 
note is that from the period 2003 to the present, no public disclosures have been undertaken leading to 
dysfunctional implementation.  While in pract ice this program continues to be running, it has ceased to be a 
public disclosure strategy.  Interviews with various staff of the EMB indicate that there are challenges in the 
institutionalizat ion of the program:  “…implementation is haphazard”; “The purpose of ecowatch is no longer 
being pursued…rating is selective”; “Ecowatch….is not being implemented as according to the DAO”; “The 
present rating system...is difficult to defend it… there are a lot of gray areas, the guidelines are unclear and need 
to be refined or cleaned up”. 
The many on and off implementation and revivals over the years and its subsequent dysfunction and sub-optimal 
operationalization generate some interesting questions. Despite its potentials and promises, why was the success 
of the pilot implementation of Ecowatch not sustained?  What are the challenges in embedding this program into 
another context? What are its implications for the actions of agents of transfer?     
 
4. Discussion and analysis 
The involvement of external and internal agents in opportunistic policy transfers creates dynamics that generate 
characteristic features of the transfer process.  It was observed that external agents had a major role in the choice 
and actual design of the policy.  The underly ing theories also created certain biases for actors which led to 
constraints in the adaptation and contextualization processes crucial to making policy  transfers work and become 
effective.  The features of the transfer process that was observed based on document reviews and interviews in  
the course of the research are described below.  This study argues that the drivers for the transfer process affected 
the manner of transfer leading to less adaptation and contextualization by focusing on one model and best 
practice and focusing on the solution rather than the problems.   
 
4.1 Focus on one model and best practice 
Numerous accounts have been documented about the folly of direct copying of policies (see for instance 
Sharman, 2010).   However, for the adoption of Ecowatch, consultants who were involved in setting up the 
system in Indonesia were brought in to the Philippines with predetermined contracts to continue working on the 
template that had been developed and not to develop a separate design. The funding for the project was based on 
the assumption of testing and promoting the EPRD strategy and did not leave much room for experimentation by 
the Philippine side. As is characteristic of a grant or funded project, the DENR was constrained to adopt the 
particular instrument being modeled, in this case the EPRD similar to Indonesia. Another characteristic of grant 
projects are the programmat ic operational system which ensures or oversees allocation of resources funds as well 
its justificat ions.  Pressure to abide and make sure that program goals, object ives or targets are fulfilled or 
subscribed to. Any deviations in plans or programs or activit ies need to be justified to donor agencies.  Therefore,  
donors keep close tabs on the workings of the program. On the one hand this is positive in that it keeps the 
program on their toes and ensures smoother operationalizat ion; but it can also be limiting and a burden in terms 
of staying as close to the program design and path so as to leave little  room for adaptation and improvisation 
which is such an important part of program implementation. 
At the receiving end, the Philippines was more than willing to take on this same strategy—it was after all lauded 
as successful and promising.  Since it worked in Indonesia, it  was assumed that similar results will be generated 
in the Philippines.  The inferential shortcuts exhibited by Filip ino policy makers led to biases with regard to the 
range and scope of the lessons they can draw from experiences abroad as well as the adaptations they can make 
to suit the policy to their particular context.  The availability of a p romising solution offered by the Indonesian 
model to a real problem found domestically put the agenda in the plate of the Philippine government, rendering 
the search for other versions of the solution over.  The representative heuristics convinced them to adopt the 
policy based on short-term ev idence of the success presented by PROPER and anchoring confined the 
adjustments to the policy at the micro-level without substantial alterat ion to suit the specific needs of the 
Philippine context. Aside from failing to consider other models of informat ion-based systems such as the Toxics 
Release Inventory in the US and Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers found in many developed and 
developing countries, as well as looking at the Philippines’ own experience in successfully implementing 
honoring and shaming programs prev iously (i.e. DENR version of Dirty Dozen  in  the 1980s and Poison Awards 
implemented by a local NGO, Sagip Pasig Movement), this type of transfer carried some risks such as context 
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oblivion, filtering of information and denial of learning results.   
Other studies evaluating the efficacy of a Public Disclosure Program in the Laguna de Bay Region in the 
Philippines that is essentially a regionalized version of Ecowatch (and also modeled after PROPER), indicated 
that the PROPER template may not be the most appropriate for the context of the Philippines (Lee, Lejano, & 
Connelly, 2013; Lambino, 2013a)  Lee and his colleagues found that flaws in the design of the program led to 
ineffectiveness and that there were degrees of incompatibility with the institutional context (ib id). They 
recommend redesigning of the program to correct the mis match between the disclosed information and target 
users.  Their suggestions include involvement of other stakeholders (e.g. NGOs) in  data verificat ion processes—
a design element found in  the successful implementation of the NGO-init iated disclosure program in  the 
Philippines called “Lason” or Poison Awards; and making available raw pollution data—a design element found 
in the TRI and PRTRs.  Thus, the adoption process would have benefited from looking at  other models of 
informat ion-based systems applied for environmental regulations and learn ing from previous endogenous 
programs instead of a narrow focus on best practice templates. 
 
4.2 Focus on solutions vs. problem solving 
Transfers associated with international best practices also create inordinate attention on the prescribed solution 
rather than the problems it aims to  solve.  In  the case study, the transfer process was premised on adopting a 
version of Indonesia’s PROPER template, so it was not surprising to observe that the pilot program was heavily 
focused on the program details right from the start and in demonstrating that the program can be implemented.  
Consultants were busy designing the data collection and reporting format and developing the computerized  
rating system even before the whole concept of using rating and disclosure as a regulatory strategy had general 
agreement and consensus within the implementing agency (especially at the implementing agent level) o r even 
that computerizing it  would be useful.  This issue became evident later on when the acceptability of full 
disclosure of the results of the rating system continue to be debated on and off by the EMB in  various evaluation 
workshops for the program and there was unwillingness for a full disclosure of rating results (Lambino, 2013b).  
The downside of focusing on program details became obvious when the computerized rat ing system was never 
used after the pilot program. In the 1990s, computers were not common or staff barely knew how to use them.  
While there were attempts to utilize the Ecowatch computer model that consultants painstakingly formulated, for 
some reason or another it proved to be unfeasible and eventually was not downloaded to the regional offices.  All 
performance ratings since 2005 have been carried out manually. Most of the current implementers are not even 
aware of the existence of a computer program generated for the purpose of more efficient rating and disclosure.  
In fact, the Laguna Lake Development Authority when they developed their own public d isclosure program in  
2005 had to develop their own computer program to be able to generate automatic ratings. 
This is consistent with Randma-Liiv (2005) who claim that those facilitating aid-related policy transfer often are 
focused on generating action and outcomes rather than “retrospective reflection” which includes previous 
success stories and failures.  This finding also comports with de Jong and Xi Bao (2007) who assert that 
transplanting specific program details are more problematic and can impede the transfer process rather than just 
borrowing general ideas and concepts and then suiting them to one’s needs.   
The solution was the one driving the policy development process.  Despite an overview assessment of the limited 
capacity and resources available within the DENR, (i.e. the lack of inspectors, equipment and even computers 
for the data management envisioned by the pilot), the pilot program’s design was ambitious and optimistic that 
these limitations will be addressed during operationalizat ion.  The Ecowatch pilot program called for more 
consistent sampling and inspection activities.  But an evaluation o f the p rogram undertaken in  2003 indicated 
that this was a significant drain on the limited resources of DENR and was considered unfeasible (REECS, 2003).  
A focus on problems rather than the solution per se would have pointed out that the need was more urgent for 
how information can be generated, organized and managed in the first place considering that informat ion 
management systems at the time were non-existent.  In interviews, DENR staff involved during the pilot phase 
indicated that the rating software developed was quite simple—described as “keyboard punching only” by one 
staff, while another said manual analysis was better than the software as the computer was not perfect.  The latter 
expressed that there was really no need to have a consultant to do the actual software as it can easily be done 
manually using the point system (DENR NCR staff, interviews).  What was really needed was a way  to improve 
credibility and reliability of the monitoring and data gathering capacity of the EMB.  It was also essential to 
convince the EMB that systematic data collection, its analysis, management and dissemination are important for 
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monitoring and enforcement as well as to develop the capacity for undertaking these.  And more importantly, 
issues linked to public disclosure needed to be threshed out.  Because the transfer process was concentrated on 
details of the program based on the template, there was less input on protocols as well as prerequisites of 
disclosure programs such as a functional informat ion database, enforcement consistency and disclosure strategies.   
The study also found that lesson drawing was limited to a certain  extent mainly  because of the primacy g iven to 
the solution itself.  All informat ion about PROPER including the lessons learned and the contextual factors that 
made it successful were routed through the policy brokers (mainly consultants of the World Bank) who 
facilitated and shared the information to the Philippine side.  During the transfer and development phase of the 
EPRD program in the Philippines, there was limited contact between the DENR agencies and BAPEDAL so the 
local agency had limited opportunity to analyze in detail the contextual factors and how exactly agents of 
BAPEDAL made the program work. 
Moreover, the Philippines was an early adopter of the program.  The program was only in its first few years of 
implementation in Indonesia when the Ph ilippines adopted a similar approach and as such, may be considered 
still very much experimental.  The empirical researches on the mechanisms that made PROPER work and 
documenting of the lessons came much later and as recent as the previous years (see García, Sterner, & Afsah, 
2007; Blackman et al., 2004; Lee, 2010; Afsah, Blackman, Garcia, & Sterner, 2013).  However, even at the onset, 
exposure and analysis of the PROPER implementation in Indonesia could have led to a comparison of the 
institutional and contextual factors that were crucial for success of the program.  For example, it would have 
been observed that in Indonesia, a committed team from BAPEDAL was very much involved in the development 
and formulation of the program.  And that part of the reason why PROPER was successful and “easier” to 
implement was because of the agency’s experience with other programs entailing ratings and disclosure—
essentially, PROPER was an extension of an existing program and built up on existing capacity (Afsah et al, 
2013).  Whereas in the Philippines, the program had to be accommodated with in the regulatory structure of the 
DENR and new institutions needed to be set up.  Ecowatch called for a new monitoring system, new ways of 
analyzing data and new channels of “enforcement” (presumably through the public channel if disclosures were 
activated).  This entailed new kinds of commitment and capacity from the DENR (Lambino, 2013b) which later 
on hindered optimal operationalization of the program.   
 
4.3 The role of champions and distributed agency 
Individual agents in the form of domestic champions were found to have played a strong role in the transfer and 
setting up of Ecowatch in  the Ph ilippines. Then DENR Secretary Vic Ramos was a technocrat whose stint at the 
DENR in the late 1990s has been claimed to be described by an international magazine as ushering in the first 
green tiger of Asia.  Bebet Gozun, the pro ject coordinator of MEIP who facilitated for EPRD to be adopted in the 
Philippines was also instrumental in rev iving it from its inert state when she assumed the post of DENR 
Secretary in 2003.  For this effort, she was in fact a recipient of the UNEP Champion of the Earth—literally  
recognized as a champion.   
For Indonesia’s case, it was undeniably through the initiative and championship of Nabiel Makarim, former 
Deputy at BAPEDAL and former Minister of Environment that brought about the formulation, implementation 
and success of PROPER.  However what may be overlooked is the fact that he had a team of equally dedicated 
personnel which ensured the latent implementation capacity of the program despite it  being shelved for a period 
of time due to the Asian Financial Crisis (Afsah et al., 2013), making it easier to revive in 2002.   
The notion that agents are crucial to institutional or policy change is undisputed.  Individual champions, policy 
entrepreneurs and “leaders” have been identified as prime drivers of policy.  Steinberg (2003) in his work 
detailing how conservation development blossomed in  Costa Rica in the 1970s and Bolivia in  the late 1980s has 
identified the role of indiv iduals who, as bilateral act ivists, have wide connections with the international sphere 
as well as deep networks with the domestic domain.  However, literatures on reform and institutional change 
while not necessarily downplaying the role that indiv iduals such as champions, institutional entrepreneurs and 
bilateral activ ists have in instituting change, have stressed that a broader range of agents are important in 
implementing and sustaining policy change.  Moreover, the exercise of leadership for development or 
institutional reform is usually undertaken in the p lural rather than the individual and this makes for successful 
policy reforms (M. Andrews et al., 2010). Some authors such as (Whittle, Suhomlinova, & Mueller, 2011), 
Andrews and his colleagues (2010) have pointed out the disadvantage of a reliance on indiv idual champions and 
argue instead for the notion of “distributed agency” which places the actualization of a policy o r p lan rests in the 
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hands and influence of a much wider range of actors.  The notion of distributed agency emphasizes the role of 
other actors such as mid-level managers all the way to field implementers in embedding and operationalizing a 
given policy or program.  Andrews (2013) finds that “new policies can demand behavior or require capacities 
that distributed agents do not have and as such it is important that they be engaged as early as the reform process 
during the design and not just as late-stage adopters”. He cites studies that indicate higher rates of diffusion (and 
positive implementation) of the policy innovation were correlated with high rates of part icipation in change 
decisions. The case of Ecowatch points to the importance of how domestic champions are approached and the 
salience of building strong and loyal coalitions for the policy reform across various tiers of the adopting agency. 
 
5. Conclusion and Implications 
This paper has focused on analyzing several features of the transfer process to gain insights into the dismal 
outcomes of an otherwise promising policy  innovation.  The analysis indicated that the motives behind the 
uptake of the EPRD system in the Philippines were found to be subjected to political, technical and economic 
influences.  The adoption was prompted by domestic actors’ sincere desire by to generate a solution to a 
domestic problem, as a response to normat ive influences and as a means to access funding provided by an 
opportunity window.   
The legit imation framework and cognitive shortcuts employed by Philippine policy makers in decision making 
worked in tandem to generate certain features of the transfer process.  Cognitive shortcuts influenced the 
decision making processes by limiting the choice to the model offered by Indonesia.  External influences brought 
with it best practice templates which were assumed to work with some modifications due to contextual 
considerations.  However, the focus on specific program details and demonstrating that the solution worked  
impeded the process of contextualization and overlooked the need for considerable adaptation.  
The prominence of external agents and domestic champions led to the successful demonstration of a pilot 
program, however this was not sustained because distributed agents within  the bureaucracy were not engaged 
deeply.  This study finds that domestic champions are important especially in in itiating policy changes or 
innovations but the main work of institutionalization and sustaining a particular policy change in itiative needs 
not just the buy-in, but the engagement of a much wider set of actors.   For Ecowatch, the lack of “pulling-in” of 
the agents internal to the implementing agency became a factor in its dysfunctional operation.  
Innovative environmental policies are urgently needed to address the world ’s increasing environmental prob lems.  
Given the limited technological and financial capabilit ies in developing countries as well as the wealth of policy  
ideas available in the international sphere, it is not surprising that developing country governmental agencies 
would look abroad for potential solutions to local problems and adopt policies already existing elsewhere.  
When the trend in the past was to look to solutions in developed nations, it has made sense to learn lessons from 
other developing nations as the conditions are claimed to be much more similar.  This has greatly improved the 
chance of transplanted policies being more successful.  However in cases when the transfer process is not 
entirely endogenously driven but facilitated and negotiated by external institutions such as aid agencies or 
financial institutions, the dynamics need to be examined as they may be fraught with challenges.  Financial and 
technical assistance which provides additional incentives for policy transfer can and should by all means be 
accessed.  This paper provides a cautionary tale of adopting best practices based on models and argues that the 
work of adaptation and translation should not be taken fo r granted and that in  some instances, the wheel may  
need to be reinvented again. 
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